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I
INTRODUCTION

There is an article written by Gilbert Ryle entitled "The Work of an Influential but Little-known
Philosopher of Science: Ludwig Wittgenstein" which appeared in "Scientific American" in September 1957. Amazingly~

this title would still be appropriate today, 15

yeqrs later, in spite of the fact that Wittgenstein is
a popular figure in Philosophy and in spite of the fact
that he does have things to say to, or about, the sci2

3
ent1fic enterprise.
The aim of this essay is to explore this rather
neglected aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. Of course,
by "neglected" I do not wish to imply that his Philosophy
of Science has been totally ignored but merely that it
has not been taken up with the vigor and popularity that
one normally associates with his Philosophy of language,
for example.
In attempting to gain a useful perspective from
which to view this present attempt, a brief accounting
of the literature which bears directly on his Philosophy
of Science will be made.
Initially, of course, there is Wittgenstein's own
work, the Tractatus

Lo~ico-Phiosophicus.

The important

point regarding this work is that it exerted the greatest influence of any single work upon the group of men
known as the Vienna Circle and their subsequent formulation of what came to be known as Logical Positivism.
Based on an interpretation of the Tractatus, two
b~sic

asumptions are reflected in the.doctrine of the

Vienna Circle:
1 - All propositions can be classified as being
e1ther logical propositions or empirical propositions;
or, in the event that they were neither logical or
empirical, that is to say neither analytic nor synthetic, they were classified as meaningless.

2 - The determination as to whether a given proposition is in fact meaningful or not can be made through
an attempted verification; in other words, some "experiment" must be conceivable which will verify the content
of a meaningful proposition.
Of course, it is generally held that the Tractatus
1s of an essentially different character than the

"classical" Positivistic thought of the Vienna Circle.
The lack of complete agreement on this point regarding
the relationship between the Positivism of the Vienna
Circle and the Tractatus, however, is reflected in most
of the literature concerned with Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Science which we have to date.
For example, Cornforth in his Science and Idealism1
equates the principle of verification in no uncertain
terms with the thought of the Tractatus concerning what
can and what cannot be said. Thus, for Cornforth, Wittgenstein is a Positivist who merely phrases the verification principle a little differently than the Circle,
in his (Wittgenstein's) case stating "To understand a
proposition means to know what is the case, if it is
true" •
In opposition to those who would equate Wittgenstein and. the LoP;ical Posi ti vis ts there are those who
1. M.Cornforth, Science and Idealism, International
Publishers, New York, 1947
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recognize a certain similarity of approach but who nevertheless assert the uniqueness of Wittgenstein's thought.
Representatives of the point of view include Max Black
(A Comoanion to Wittp:enstein's Tractatus 1 ), G.E.M. Anscombe
(An Introduction to Witt~enstein's Tractatus2), and
others, all of whom note that on Wittgenstein's own
terms it is quite possible for the question "How is that
proposition verified?" itself to be senseless.
Also, it has been noted that what is perhaps the
most important feature of Wittgenstein's thought concerning Science in the Tractatus is not the principle
of verification at all l;>ut rather a certain "concept
of organization" based on his remarks at 6.341-6.343.
Here he likens scientific theory to the application of
a linguistic "net" with an arbitrary and pre-determined
size and shape of mesh. The point being that the "net"
will determine what information, what facts,

obtained in any given scientific activity or experiment. 3
~:re

Pointing to this "net theory" further serves to distin-

.

guish Wittgenstein from the Positivists insofar as it
represents a certain relativization of the scientific
enterprise which is not.found in the doctrine of the
1. See for example p.171 and Chapter LXXX.I
2. See np.150-5
). The best accounts of this are given by B.F.
McGuinness tn his "Philosophy.of Science in the
Tractl3.tusn and by Black, .2.E·ill·• pp.)47-52
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V1~nna

Circle.

Finally, along these same lines is the article by
George L. Proctor entitled "Scientific Laws and Scientific Objects in the TractRtus". In this article Proctor
presents an investigation into the nature of scientific
laws based on "model theory", the theory which is reflected, in his opinion, by the Tractatus.
Now, what should be noted at this point is that
while the Tractatus is only one of the works of Wittgenstein, it has gained the almost exclusive attention of
those who are concerned with his Philosophy of Science.
The sole exeption to this would appear to be "Science
and Metaphysics: A Wittgenstein1an Interpretation" by
Hugh Petrie which is based on the Philosophical Investigations. This article contains helpful insight into
Witt~enstein's

thoughts about Science found in the

Philosouhical Investigations but it does have one shortcoming - it

is~

a complete articulation of Wittgen-

stein's Philosophy of Science as it is to be found in
or formulated from the Philosophical Investigations.
The fact that it does not claim to be so is nugatory.
Thus the need for a further expression of his Philosophy of

Scie~ce

appears evident. This is especially

true in view of the fact that there are differences in
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his fundamental outlook on language as presented in
the ·Tractatus and 1n the Philosophical Investigations,
and on this basis one may assume that the fundamental
foundation on which his Philosophy of Science rests has
also changed. This assumption, of course, is based on
the fact that Wittgenstein's thought is essentially
geared to linguistic considerations and to the character
of lenguage itself.
A more specific statement of the task to be undertaken in this essa.y, then, is that it will seek a clear
and comnlete formulation of Wittgenstein's Philosophy
of Science based on
The

proble~

th~

Philosouhical Investigations.

of where to begin, that is, how to

anproach his Philosophy of Science is of no little significance in light of the fact that Wittgenstein does
not speak to the problem with any substantial frequency
in the Philosonhical Investigations. Thus we are faced
with the task of determining an approach, realizing of
course that the choice is for the most part arbitrary
and

c~n

only be assessed through the basic suppositions

which underlie our choice.
A few observations which will be of assistance in
gutdtn~

us in the proper direction are as follows:
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1 - In his "Philosophy of Science in the Trac ta tus"
McGu1nness notes 1 that " ••• in my opinion Wittgenstein's
philosophy of science need not involve any departure
from his picture theory of propositions." Generalizing
this comment, one can say simply that any given philosopher's philosophy of science should be expected to resemble the rest of his philosophy. Here one may point
to the characteristic approach of a given individual
as viewed through his!!: priori suppositions, terminology, etc •• The inference in this regard is that such
characteristics will present themselves as relevant
structuring reg9rdless of the immediate subject matter.
Insofar as this is a vqlid observation, then, we
can readily expect Wittgenstein to view Science in the
Philosophical Investigations in terms of the basic
themes of language-games, meaning as use, Forms of
life, etc •• This is to say that his philosophy of science
should closely parallel his philosophy of language.
2

David Pole in his The Later Philosophy of Witt-

genstein says "It seems that Wittgenstein's interest in
Mathematics

re~...ained

in some sense a focal point in his

thinking". This statement refers to the fact that one
can find more or less explicit references to Mathematics
1. p.160
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in much of Wittgenstein, in both his early and his
later writings. 1 Once

agai~,

if this be a valid obser-

vation, than we will do well to direct some effort in
this direction with the hope that it will better clarify
his thought regarding science, the supposition being
that there is a parallel between his· philosophy of
science and his philosophy of mathematics.

3 - The final observation, which may be viewed as
an qssumption at this point, is that his views on Science
and Mathematics are related to his views on language,
that is, that his philosophy of language is in a certain
sense the basis of his philosophy of mathematics and
more importantly here for us of his philosophy of
science.
On the basis of these three observations, an attempt w+ll be made to formulate Wittgenstein's philosophy of science. Our goal will be to show that his
philosophy of mathematics, which reflects the concept
of constructivism, is grounded in his philosophy of
language; and, that this constructivism (appropriately
modified to reflect the distinctions between Science
and Mi::ithematics) most clearly reflects his view of the
1. To qssure oneself of this, one need only refer
to his Tract~tus, Philosophische Grammatik,Philosophische Bernerkun~en, and most especially to
his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.
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scientific enterprise.
our method will entail

tw~

further points:

1 - Until it becomes necessary in our analysis
to distinguish between science and mathematics, no differentiation will be made. Thus, for our purposes mathematics will be considered to be one of the sciences,
at least initially. Such an approach based on mutually
~nplica.ble

characteristics such as the inherent organ-

ization of both mathemqtics and science will thus be
utilized. Furthermore it would appear that we have reason to suspect that Wittgenstein himself would have
followed such a course, or recommended that a similiar
one be followed. For, the final paragraph of his
Investi~ations

reads:

An investigation is possible in connexion with
mathematics which is entirely analogous' to our
investigation of psychology!- It is just as little
a mathematical investigation as the other is a
psycholo~ical one.3
2 - In order to grasp better the potential feas1-

~

bility of viewing science as a sort of "linguistic construction", selected subjects related to the scientific
enterprise will be reviewed. These subjects will include
scientific laws, truth, etc ••
1. My emphasis
2. A science
3. It is rather a linguistic one, that is to say,
one involving the use of language.
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To summarize, the method of my presentation will
be to ~ive an exposition of what I feel are the important central points in Wittgenstein's philosophy of
language in the Philosophical Investigations. Then, I
will attempt to show that what he has to say about Mathematics in the Philosouhical Investigations and in his
I

~emarks on the Foundations of Mathematics is in harmony

with his philoso~hy of language and leads naturally to
a. "constructivist" philosophy of Mathematics •.. Finally,

I will argue that his philosophy of science can be construed analogously as a "constructivist" philosophy of
science, bearing a marked similarity to his Philosophy
of ma.thematics. Of course, it will not only be necessary
to compare Science and Mathematics but also ·:to contrast
them as well. In this effort I hope to clarify his
position in the Philosouhical Investigations with regard to the verification principle of the Positivists
and to explore his so-called "grammatical-empirical"
distinction.

II

LANGUAGE

It is my intent here to present what I feel are
the key aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy of languag~

in the Philosophical Investigations in the belief

that it is impossible to investigate his thoughts regarding

m~thematics

and ultimately science without

first possessing a certain knowledge of his views concerning languav,e.
In so doing, I intend to present key aspects of
12

lJ
his philosophy of language only to the extent necessary
to establish a given position and then to question and
examine that position.
· To begin, what is perhaps

~he

most basic concept

found in the Philosophical Investigations is that of
language-games. Wittgenstein himself tells us to "Look
on the language-game as the primary thing"(656) 1 • Almost immediately in the Philosouhical Investigations
he notes:
We can ••• think of the whole process of using
words ••• as one of those games by means of
which children learn their native language.
I will call these g9.mes "language-games" and
will sometimes speak of a primitive language
as a lqnguage-ga~e ••• I shall also call the
whole, consisting of language and the actions
into which it is woven, the "language-game"{?).
Shortly after making this observation he presents
us with a list of activities in order to give us some
idea of the multiplicity of language-games(2J). Among
these examples are such activities as describing, reporting, presenting, etc •• This sample listing, of
course, is supposed to impress upon us the fact that
there is a countless number of language-games, for
"somethin~

new (spontaneous, specific) is always a lan-

R"uage-game" but "we remain unconscious of the prodigious
1. Paragraph numbers noted in p~rentheses without
additional rn~rking will be used in this essay
to refer to Philosophical Investigations.
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diversity of all the everyday la.nguage-games because the
clothing of our language makes everything alike"(p.224).
The analogy of a language-game can accordingly be
1
viewed in terms of what Zabeeh calls an "open concept".
It is "open" in two senses:
1 - As an infinite or repeating mathematical
series is "open", that ls, in the sense that it can
always be continued or "added onto".
2 - Insofar as the analogy lacks any natural boundary. Now, this second point refers to a most' interesting
observation which ls made by Wittgenstein concerning
games. In response to the question "What is common to
all games?" he answers, "You will not see something
that is common to all, but similarities, relationships,
and a whole series of them at that".(66)
This position of his leads directly to the doctrine
of "family resemblance" and the conclusion that "games
form a fqmily"(67). The stress ls thus placed on .. sameness" and questions of difference are surpressed as
when in response to the question "How is the concept of
a gqme bounded?". he remarks that "that never troubled
you before when you used the word "game""(68}. But,
1. F.Zabeeh, "On Language Games and Forms of Life"
in Essays on Wittgenstein, edited by E.D.Klemke,
U. of Illi~ois Press, 1971, p.330
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Specht notes that the concept of games is not viewed
in as significant a manner by other philosophers 1 and
that perhaps Wittgenstein's reply could have been a
bit more informative.
Now, it is most significant to note the vagueness
that is associated not only with the concept of languagegames but with most of Wittgenstein's concepts. The
significance comes to light when one attempts to evaluate the success of the analogy of a language-game, an
evaluation that could well borrow Bergmann's title
"The Glory and the Misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein". 2
It cannot be denied that the analogy of the language-game is a most illuminating analogy, one that is
quite useful in grasping hold of the phenomenon of
language (as is attested by the popularity of his work).
Furthermore, it would appear that it

is~

appropriate

that he should feel compelled to use analogies to portray language. A glimpse into the historical use of
analogy shows, for example, that a tenet of Thomist
philosophy is that there is a necessity for analogous
predication with regard to God. The reason given is
thgt we with our limited intellects cannot hope to know
1. E.K.Specht, The Foundqtions of Wittgenstein's
Late Philosouhy, translated by D.E.Walford,
Manchester University Press, 1969, p.47
2. Klemke, _QE.cit., pp.25-43
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Him 1n a direct and absolute manner and thus are forced
to obtain analogously what we cannot directly.
Now I contend that Wittgenstein holds a similiar
nosition, only with regard to language instead of with
God in his adoption of the language-game analogy. For
1t is recalled from his earlier work, the Tractatus,
that l.qnguage forms the limit of my world( 5.6), and
that I cannot come to have a knowledge of language as
a whole since that would entail reaching outside of
the world, which is impossible(4.12). Similarly in the
Philosonhical Investigations, one can only find meaning
and thus knowledge in specific language-games, that is,
through analogy.
What worked for the Thomists should work for Wittgenstein, but does it? I think that at best there are
some difficulties that should not be overlooked.
Wittgenstein characterized his own work as descriptive, explaining nothing, but merely laying the
different parts or segments of language before us. 1
Some individuals, however, in opposition to this
chgracterization

m~intain

his own activity

"t~kes

that it certainly seems that

us outside this monadism of
2

It stands over and collates them".
1. Pole, The Later Philosonhy of Wittgenstein,
p.80
2. l.1?19.· p.84
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The point here is that there exists a dilemma revolving around the necessity of analogous predication
in Wittgenstein (which he must hold if he is merely
describing various aspects of language) and the necessity
of rising "above" individual la.nguage-games (in which
oase knowledge becomes in a certain sense direct and
hence analogy needless). This necessity to rise above
langua~e-games

and the problem that it poses _can be

best seen by viewing an individual language-game and
asking "On what basis can we determine whether a given
13.ction is a part of our game?" The answer to this question must, I feel, be based on Wittgenstein's metaphor
of the cogwheel "engaging0 (136), which would seem to
suggest nothing more than that a given action or fact
must "fit" properly into what is already given. Seemingly there is nothing adverse in such a concept, but
Pole

~ives

an observation which strongly suggests other-

wise:
Here we have a luminous metaphor - and
yet no more than a metaphor. For there
can be no way of testing whether this
or that linguistic wheel has failed to
en~a~e. except to grasp the pattern in
each case; to arrive at some sort of
insight into that unique set of relations which it professes but fails to
form a part of.
The point will bear repetition. We
require an intuition into the unity of
a complex, a grasp of the way in which
a set of terms or elements cohere. 1
1. Ibid, p.81
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It occurs that one may here appeal to the already
existent stock of language-games and to the "Form of
Life" in order to properly be said to grasp the unity,
the structure of our given language-game, but in so
doing I believe that we will have side-stepped the
1ssue. Perhaps the issue can best be put by asking
"WhRt guidelines were there in the "first" languagegame?"
The answer can only be "intuition", and by "intuition" I do not mean merely a dec1sion(186) or an unnecessary shuffle(21J) but a necessary extra-linguistic
insight g9ined outside of the language-game •.
Of course, one may say that this "first" languagegame doesn't make sense, it never existed. In answer it
is held that

it~

have occurred based on Wittgenstein's

own analogy of language as a city.
Our language can be seen as an ancient
city: a maze of little streets and
squares, of old. and new houses, and of
houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regul~r streets and uniform houses. (18)
Old houses, new houses - old

~treets,

new streets -

there is a passage of time and there is an image of
growth. It would seem strange to say that I am not allowed to ask who built the first house and how it was

19
.bUilt! 1 What I am suggesting is that if we are to consider language-games as houses, it does make sense to
question the initial construction of such houses and to
rurther inquire into the "plan" which was used. For,
while it may be accepted that the historical development of language is "hap-hazzard" {as is implied by
Wittgenstein's analogy), this still leaves unanswered
the problem of the origin of language, of the first
houses of the city.
The traditional view, however, reflects the
opinion that we assume an existing stock of languagegames and the related metaphor of Forms of Life.
The metaphor of Forms of life is used only five
times in the

Investi~ations

2

and yet an understanding

of it is of great importance to an understanding of
Wittgenstei~'s

ideas concerning language and language-

games. There is a certain vagueness to be overcome in
articul~tin~

the concept because of Wittgenstein's re-

luctance to discuss it, but initially it may be viewed
as "that which is in some sense characteristic ·or being
human". Seen in such a manner it can be related to the
concept of gqmes in general so that, for example, it
will allow men to construct and play a game of basket1. See Specht,op.cit., p.182, for a similar criticism.
- 2. Paragraphs 19, 2), 241, and pages 174 and 226
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llall with a ten foot high rim but will not allow them
to play with a rim 1000 feet high. In an analogous

sense such is the case with all games. Thus, the concept of Forms of life serves as a control over the
creation of specific language-games.
Further suggested articulations of the concept include: 1
A - The intersection of all existing language-

games: a kind of relationship

B - Something the prime example of which is a
language-game itself
C - A way of life, or mode, manner, fashion, or

style of life, or

D - One of the formal things in life - something typical of a living being, typical
in the sense of being very broadly in the
same class as the growth or nutrition of
living organisms, or as the organic complexity which enables them to propel themselves about, or to react in complicated
ways to their environment.
Now the problem with three of the above accounts

(A,C, and D) is that they lead to an objectification of
1. Hunter, "Forms of Life in Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations", in Klemke,
.Q!?.Cit., pp.273-97•
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a given form of life and thus destroy the time honored

phrase th8.t "the meaning is in the use". Only "B" which
sa.ys that such forms are nothing more than languagega.mes themselves survives this criticism which is rooted
in the very heart of his philosophy. The only problem
with accepting "B", however, is that it allows the concept of "Forms of life" to be so vague that it cannot
be successfully applied to all situations in which a
specific determination is required, nor can it successfully oppose the suggestion that this leads to an infinite regress of games or at best to a "playful"
circularity.
In discussing the relationship between various
langua.ge-g~mes

Pole argues that "Wittgenstein, in in-

sisting on the pluralism of language-games, seems to
lose sight of the unity of language" and that "If
these games are to be thought of as

disc~ete,

it must

be rather as nuclei in a continuous meium; the matrix
they are born of is one."1
I would like to maintain that whatever vision
Wittgenstein does possess of the unity of language is
contained in the concept of Forms of life. Unfortunately,
this reruirk will probably go further toward destroying
.... •")'..

any so-callen unity of lqngua~e than toward establishing
1. Pole, .QE.cit., p.92
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the concept of the Forms of life. The reason I say this
is because while it is quite clear how the concept
acts unon our game of basketball, it is not at all
clear how it acts upon .(screens, allows, forbids) language-games. For there appears to be no criterion, no
real basis here which can assist us in determining
what does not count as a language-game. Any activity,
regardless of how insignificant it may be, qualifies as
a

lan~uqge-gRme

within a given life form. We need only

focus our attention upon it (an activity) and automatica.lly it becomes a language-game.
Ent we may still ask, obvious as the answer may
seem, "Is the concept of Forms of life essentially linguistic in character or not?" The answer will bear
heavily on his philosophy of science, of course. The
response to be given is that based on all of the articulations of the concept (previously given) it must be
wholly linguistic in nature. By this I mean to say
that there appears to be nothing entailed by the concept which Wittgenstein would not readily call "lingutstlc". Later, however, I shall return to this
question.
In continuing our present examination of Forms of
life, we note that Hunter, in discussing the matter

23
says, "I don't know whether to say that Wittgenstein
thought there is an interesting analogy here, the
drawing of which can make certain things about language-using clearer to us ••• but what will matter is the
points about language-using which are brought out by
the notion, whichever way it is taken."1
The most important notions, of course, are that
languaP;e-gqmes are meant to imply sneakin.ir and activity
(9s opposed to a ststic view of language) and that the
agreement

~.,hich

is necessary between the players of any

game ( l~.nguage-game) is grounded not within the languagegame itself but in the Form of life. Wittgenstein himself
notes these points. At (2J) he comments:
Here the term "language-game" is meant to
bring into prominence the fact that the
speaking of language is part of an activity,
or of a form of life.
And

l~ter

he notes:

It is what human beings say that is true or
false; and they agree in the language they
use. That is not agreement in opinions but
in form of life. (241)
Thus it anpears that the type of possible language-P;ames and the "progress" (activity) that is to be
fou~d

within them are both ultimately governed by
1. J.F.M.Hunter, "Forms of Life in Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations", in Klemke, 273-

9?
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Forrns of 11 f e.
·The vagueness that surrounds this notion ls per:tiaos its greatest shortcoming; however, it ls also its
grP.atest

~sset.

The problems which arise all center

around the question "What is the distinction between a
Form of life and language itself (in the widest sense
of the T>:rord)?" If there is no distinction, and I do not
believe that there really is one, what is to be gained?
For, it

s~ems

that this is merely another term for

Language, and as such it is simply a new coat tailored
to the form of the rather tired view 1 that man is an
essentially· linguistic animal, that his unique characteristic is precisely his ability to use language. Furtherif in fact Form of life is but another name for

mor~,

Language, we can easily see how it is
~ames

tha~

language-

arise from it; but this surely is not then a

terribly profound concept. In effect it is no more useful to say thRt language-games arise out of a particular
form of life than it is to observe that swimming strokes
arise out of a particular situation - water.2
Of course 1t is an example of Wittgenstein's genius
th~t hP did not say that language-games arise out of

1. Si~ilar thoughts are given by Aristotle, Heidegger,
and Chomsky, for example.
2. This is my answer to the so-called "organic"
account of Forms of life.

25
i~nguage,

but rather that they arise out of various

Forms of life. It ls the same genius that prompted

him to say that the structure of reality determines
the structure of language and then to suggest that it
1s really the other way round.

1

Wh8t this reflects, of course, is an essentially
]Oetic genius which just happens to be utilized in an
investigation of Philosophy. An example of this sort of
poetic genius utilized in another area (Politics) will
help to drive home the point. A current political fig-

ure was asked, "What happens if you win this primary
election, and what happens if you lose it?" He answered,
"If I

~in,

it's like spring tonic; and if I lose, it's

llke getting the flu."
The method in both cases is the same. An individual
is prompted to speak, but when he does so it is always
through analogies. Sometimes these analogies are rather
transparent devices used to evade an issue, as in the
case of our politician who can not admit that a loss is
a defeat, even though that is what can be deduced. 2
Hence he builds an analogy, which precisely because it
~

an analogy allows him to say at a later date that

what he really meant was that "getting the flu" meant
that he would ~et sick. But of course people never
1. Pears, Wit~genstein, p.)
2. It is further transnarent because he is not
t~kP.n SP.riously to be a poet.
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bother to analyse politicians in such great detail
and so most such analogies are soon forgotten.
However people do analyse.the words of philosophers
in detail. And because of this propensity for analysis,
analogies are more often than not viewed in terms of
their "richness" rather than in terms of "evasive devices". Wittgenstein's poetic genius has thus all but
insured a continuing debate which will cease to be interesting only in those moments when it is forgotten
that his main tool as a poet-philosopher is his habitual
use of analogous predication.
Now, a concept closely related to Forms of life
is the concept of rules. This concept is important because it helps us to understand to.what extent a particular Form of life can affect a language-game and also
to what extent we are "free" to act as we please in our
construction of language-games.
Concerning rules, Wittgenstein~ells us (54) that
they do not have a single purpose, but are established
for a variety of reasons. Hence we may observe that
rules are used as:
A - Aids in teaching a game (Example: Always
IOOk honest when playing poker)
B - Instuments of the game itself (Example:
Brid~e

is played, generally, with four

27

people), or
C - Natural laws governing the play (Example: A
knight is moved thus in Chess)
In unison, then, these formulations imply that a
given language-game must be understood solely in terms
of the rules according to which it is played. These
rules, of course, serve as standards 1 which on a trad1tional interpretation of Wittgenstein are found to rest
on aRreement. 2 This is the basis of all arguments which
seek to make him a conventionalist. Moreover, it is
stressed that such agreements are always arbitrary,
artsing out of accepted practice.
Based on the illusory validity of the "conventionalist•• argument, Pole has found warrant to claim
that "what we have here are two radically different
views of language. In the one the key notion is that of
a rule ••• In the other ••• the emergence of new forms is
seen as part of the essence of the system.3 The concept of Forms of life and the concept of rules are
viewed as mutually incompatible.
However, by means of two separate accounts I wish
to hold that they are essentially related.
1. Pole, ..Q.£.Cit., p.35
2. P~~e 226 (PI) is often quoted in this regard
3. Pole, ..Q.£•£11• p.62
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Account #1 - Rules can be viewed analogously as
fulfilling the same requirements that the concept of
law fulfills in Plato. On this account we find a number
of similarities. Initially we find that laws and rules
are both founded on agreement. The lack of the philosopher-king in Plato and the lack of a similar "objective standard" in Wittgenstein (PI) makes this a
necessary condition of possible construction in either
case. Further, in neither case do we find the possibility
to construct perfect "instruments". In Plato there are
no perfect laws because every law must be general in
nature by necessity (a matter of scope) and hence must
disregard the specific instance. 1 Hence all laws will
be found to be imperfect if a requirement of universal
applicability is imposed.
Now, this is nothing more than a problem of application for Plato. Likewise with Wittgenstein, there can
be no perfect, foolproof rules - for every rule has to
be understood and applied, and can also thus be
apnlied.

mis~

•

A further noint of comparison is that in both
cases the "i"'lstruments" are designed to assist us in
the performance of living. Laws for Plato are designed
1. See Plato's Statesman, 294b
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to assist us in achieving an ordered life in the absence of the philosopher-king (and his unique ability
to apprehend the Forms). Similarly rules for Wittgenstein
are designed to assist us in performing language-games.
Finally, the most interesting point of comparison
is that both rules and laws are "affected" by a more
basic concent - one which does not determine which
laws or rules should be established but which merely
guides us in our choice. For Plato this concept is the
Forms (and Nous) and for Wittgenstein it is, of course,
Forms of life .1
Account #2 - Rules reflect the possibilities afforded to us by Forms of life. As such, they can be regarded as sample instances of a probabilistic knowledge
of the unique character of a given Form of life. In
such a case if we are granted the luxury .of equi-probabi li ty (which Wittgenstein is quite willing to give) 2
with regard to individual rule-instances, we can be
found to possess the necessary tools for Form of life
"determinations". Now, if such determinations are
possibile in theory, and I believe that they are, then
they can·only be so based on the existence of an es1. As a coincidence it should further be noted that
both men utilize some sort of "form" which affects the quasi-material constructs.
2. Tractatus (6.4)
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sential ·relationship between rules and Forms of life.
Rules are normally viewed in Wittgenstein not only
in terms of games, however, but also in terms of
grammar. "Grammar, in Wittgenstein's sense, is the
structure of language, or seen differently, its system
of rules". 1 It is easy to see why rules can be equated
with grammar, of course, since the analogy of games
is after all merely a device in the investigation of
language. Thus, in language, grammar can be viewed as a
set of rules which regulates the use of various combinations of words. 2 Grammar on this account arises
and is formulated in much the same manner as other
rules of games, that is, out of accepted usage. Grammar thus construed is arbitrary, being based on agree-·
ment - an agreement which Wittgenstein tells us has the
pragmatic consequence of guiding our choice of words.J
Of course, this "guiding" feature of grammar cannot itself be arbitrary because of the fact that
grammar, like other sorts of rules, is affected by Forms
of life. Nevertheless, many who have recognized this
arbitrary aspect of grammar in Wittgenstein have not
been content with it and have sought to ground it on
1. Pole, on.cit., p.Jl
2. G.Hallett-:-Trittgenstein's Definition of Meaning
as Use, p.189
J. See paragraph 178 (PI)

Jl
a more substqntial foundation. Their efforts have most
often led to the assumption that our grammar is actually
not as arbitrary as we may think, and that in fact its
foundation can be found in logic.
They explain, for example, that the reason why
we find it wrong to say "I remember what happened tomorrow" is not because we have merely agreed to call
such a use of words wrong but because a logical, or
conceptual, necessity dictates that certain combinations
of words (here "remember" and "tomorrow") cannot be
properly used.

1

Also, grammar can be used to dictate

the manner in which individual words are to be used
(as nouns, adverbs, etc.). For example, in a passage
from

Throu~h

the Looking Glass Lewis Carroll notes the

following violation:
"Just look along the road, and tell me if
you see either of them."

"I see nobody on the road", said Alice.
"I only wish I had such eyes", the king remarked in a fretful tone. "To be able to
see Nobody! And at that distance too! Why,
it's as much as I can do to see real people,
by this light!"~
The more serious objection, however, comes from
those who hold that Lo~ic represents our prime example
1. An amusing example of this is given in "Wittgenstein, Nonsense, and Lewis Carroll" by
Pitcher in Fann, p.332
2. Ibid, p.311-4
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of exectitude and that whenever we call (challenge) a
move in a language-game, our ultimate appeal can only
be to the principles of Logic. In answer, however,
Wittgenstein merely notes that logical laws (such as
the law of excluded middle) serve merely as standards
or rules themselves and that it is always possible to
imagine that we should cease to accept these rules
and to adopt others.
In this regard I do not believe that Wittgenstein
has effectively blocked the objection in favor of vieing Logic as a preferred language. He has not done so
because while it is clear thathe now (in the

Philoso~

-,

phical Investigations) attempts to destroy any hierarchy of languages he nevertheless is forced to locate
necessity in the logical structuring of grammar. Thus
he has merely shifted his perspective from Logic as
language to Logic as grammar.
Now the only basis that we are given in Wittgenstein
for the assessment of either language-games or the
rules of lenguage-games is the concept of "usefulness".1
Unfortunately, he says little about "usefulness" in
the

Investt'1':~ttons

and so we are still left with the

question "Useful for r..,hat?" It is much the same case
1. Specht, op.cit., p.171

JJ
as with those who would espouse an ethic of efficiency.
We can always point out that it really makes no sense
to say that something is merely "useful" or "efficient"
for these words are used in our grammar in a transitive
sense, thus implying that there is something for which
a given rule or action is useful or efficient. Commonly held ends include, for example, such things as
order, self-interest, etc ••
In Wittgenstein we appear to have this transitive
usage but no objective. We are told that we play language-games but are not told why we play them. Now, it
should be pointed out that this is not necessarily entailed by his analogy of games. In Psychology, for example, there are those 1 who, like Wittgenstein, argue
that

insi~ht

can effectively be gained through an ap-

peal to the analogy of games. In both Wittgenstein and
Berne we can find varieties of games, all of which are
in some sense defined by rules. However, on Berne's
account:
Games are clearly differentiated from
procedures, rituals, and pastimes by
two chief characteristics: (1) their
ulterior quality and (2) the payoff.__._-----._
Procedures may be succ-essful, ri t
· effective (Wittgenstein's "usef n'8
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and pastimes profitable, but all of them
are by definition candid; they may involve contest, but not conflict, and the
ending may be sensational, but 1t is not
dramatic.1
Turnin~ to a typical analysis of a game 2 one 1m-

mediately becomes aware of the inclusion of a category labeled "Aim" which is precisely what is left
out of Wittgenstein's concept of games!
Even if "Aim" can be translated into "motive" or
even into "value", this thesis (observation) does not
appear to be diluted in the least. A textual reading
reveals that Wittgenstein rarely uses the words "motive"
or "value" in his writing; and, of course, he would have
no reason to if he remains consistent with a behavioristic philosophic account, a radical behavioristic account.
This then leads us to observe that there is no
room here for spontaneity and novelty. Wittgenstein's
story of games thus becomes a somber picture in which
human life is merely a series of games, "a process of
filling in time until the arrival of death, or Santa
Claus, with very little choice, if any, of what kind
of business one is going to transact during the long
wait". 3
1. Ibid, p.48
2. Ibid, p.86, for example
). Ibid, p.184
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What this slight digression has to do with
lo~ical

necessity is simply this - in Wittgenstein

we can look for its basis in only two places: in language-games or in Forms of life. But the vagueness
which I have ascribed to Wittgenstein becomes most apparent here. On the one hand. it appears that the
source of necessity lies solely within language inasmuch as Forms of life are essentially linguistic configurations. However, on the other hand. since he does
not explicitly equate Language and Forms of life,
the option is apparently left open (even though only
as a mere crack in the door) to hold that the source
of necessity is not really in language at all, that
after all is said and done this view is merely an illusion and that actually its source is in our Forms
of life. This, of course, is safe to say only because
Forms of life are only susceptible to a vague probabalistic analogous interpretation (as opposed to being
1
direct "objects" of knowledge. In conclusion, then,
I shall hold that Wittgenstein has not really "explained" necessity at all but has merely given us a somewhat
interesting metaphor with which to play.
This point is especially vital to his philosophy
1. Some comments related to this position can be
found in Specht, especially see p.159.
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of science and so I will return to it in Chapter III.
At the moment, however, I wish to inquire into another
ramification of the language-game thesis - the constitution of objects. The need to review this topic should
be especially obvious in light of the claim of science
that it does not deal with the "mystical" but with "good
old-fashioned objects".
We may begin our discussion of objects by saying
that what Wittgenstein does is to totally revoke the
possibility of talking about "good old-fashioned objects". Now in talking about objects we'appear to
have two definite options open to us: we may assert
with the Realist that objects exist in an independent
state, so to sneak, or we may assert that they do not.
In the

Investi~ations

we find an exposition affirming

the latter alternative, something which must follow
in view of what has been said concerning languagegames. Quite explicitly as a matter of fact Wittgenstein
tells us that the constitution of objects is intimately
bound to grammar, that "essence is expressed by grammar" ( 371), that "grammar tells us what kind of object
anything is"(3?J).
It should be remembered in this regard that grammar does not exist as some independent entity but
rather is to be characterized as a function of a
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language-game. Thus, we may say that objects are second-generation functions of language-games and as such
can only exist Within a language-game.
Looking further, we find that the activity whereby objects are constituted is best described as "organization". The concept of organization, however, requires
that we allow several things as given:
1 - As was noted in discussing language-games we
must assume an already existing stock of language-games,
and thus an already existing supply of objects.
2 - We must assume that these existing objects
are essentially liguistic in character, formulated in
accordance with the rules of the games in which they
occur.
Granted these two requirements, Wittgenstein's
"constitution" theory can then tell us how further
objects are formulated. Essentially, it amounts to
the argument that we apprehend the "reserve" of given
objects and in constructing new

l~nguage-games

we sort

(sepqrate, differentiate, organize) these existing
objects in light of the requirements imposed by the
grammqr of our new games. 1 Concerning the objects which
already exist, we must assume that the same process
wi:is used in their constitution when the language-games
1. See Specht, p.155, ~or an example of this~

in which they presently occur were first articulated.
A distinction between strictly grammatical objects and empirical objects is not to be overlooked.
of course. The mi;inner in which this distinction is
presented to us is through an examination of proposittons which can properly be

s~id

to reflect the

"nature" of the objects which they contain. Thus we
e.re found to have grammatical propositions and empirical propositions.
A grammatical proposition is one whose truth
value is exclusively dependent upon specific grammatical
rules. (Example: A bicycle has two wheels
body has extension) 1

_2!:

Every

An empirical proposition, on the other hand, depends for its truth value partly on the rules of usage
of the words occurring in them (grammar), and partly
on the empirical data.
Now this

disti~ction·

is quite similar to that

given to us by A.J.Ayer with regard to analytic and
synthetic propositions. However, I believe that the
similarity between the two men on this point is misleading. Ayer is essentially sympathetic with Positivist doctrine 2 , and as such the ultimate appeal with
1. Pp.251-2, (PI)
2. Especially with his La~guage, Truth, and Logic
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regqrd to empirical propositions is to their ver1f1cat1on, and the Verification Princiule itself ultimately
assumed a Realist's world. The limits of the empirical
are taken on this account to be the world itself.
Needless to say, Wittgenstein would not accept
such a picture. For him, nThe limit of the empirical ls concept-formation"(RFM, III-29). This blunt statement summarizes a host of observations, all of which
undermine the purity of the Positivist's verification.
The most general observation perhaps is that any
exuerimental activity is conditioned by the terms
which underlie that activity. On this point one will
find many examples given by Kuhn, who in his The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions states precisely
the same thing saying "Scientific fact and theory
are not categorically se-parable" 1 and that "The existence of the paradigm sets the problem to be solved". 2
Thus one's activity can be found to be governed by
the paradigm and "to desert the paradigm is to cease
practicing the science it defines". Wittgenstein
similarly would say that we have ceased to play the
same game. To give anexample of this thesis, one
need only point out that the empirical facts which
1. Kuhn, on.cit., p.7
2. Ibid, P':'2~A paradigm for Kuh~ it should be
noted is like a model or pattern. "an object
for further articulation and specification".
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ere "found" under the Phlogiston theory or paradigm
are riot at 'Ill the same ones which are found under
current theories. Under the former paradigm the weight
differential found to exist between a given metal in
its "normal" state and in a heated state was found to
be caused by a change in the amount of phlogiston,
while in the latter paradigm the weight change is said
to be caused by the effect of exidation on the metal's
molecular
The

s~ructure

conclusio~:

and hence its molecular weight.

there is no real distinction which can

be drawn between concept and fact.
As Petrie notes, "If Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of drawing a line between the conceptual and
the empirical, then this indeterminacy should be reflected in perception as well 11 • 1 And, it would seem that in
Wittgenstein's doctrine of seeing as "aspect-seeing"
we have a substantiation of this supposition.
In speaking about this Wittgenstein notes that
there are two uses of the word "see":
The one:"What do you see there?" - "I
see this" (and then a description, a
drawing, a copy). The other: "I see a
likeness between these two faces"
( p .193 ,PI)
Followin~

this remark Wittgenstein goes into a

discussion of "noticing an asnect". This he further
1. "Science and Metaphysics: A Wittgensteinian
Interpretation" by H. Petrie (in Klemke), p.
141
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divides, saying "I must distinguish between the
continuous seeing" of an aspect and the "dawning" of
an aspect {p.194)(In this place appears his example of
the duck-rabbit.) Now what he wants to show here is
that we often perceive an object

~

another object.

Exactly why this is so, what causes it, he wishes to
leave, however, to psychologists (p.19)). Petrie, nevertheless, suggests that perhaps "Seeing as" is "the
ability (propensity might be better) to play more
than one game with the object 11 • 1
In reading Petrie one is strongly inclined to
say that Wittgenstein can be found to reject the possibility of neutral seeing or perception based on his
investigation of seeing as "seeing as". Now, if this
is what Petrie wishes to hold, then I fear that he has
been led astray. Of course Wittgenstein would hold that
there is no possibility of neutral seeing, but this is
not based on his analysis of aspect seeing.
Aspect seeing (seeing-as) is perhaps the most
dr~matic

in the

side of his account of perception as given

Investi~ations

most space (number of

and clearly it consumes the
p~_ges),

but neither is it his

sole account of seeing nor is it the most basic. On
p.191 he notes that there are two uses of the word
1. 112.19.· p .158
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"seeing" and an account of "seeing as" only deals
with one (explicitly).
Now whereas the "seeing as" account involves the
multiplicity of language-games and of objects, his
more basic account describes the perception that
occurs within a single language-game and explains the
perception of a single, as opposed to a multiplicity,
of objects.
The key to Wittgenstein's theory of perception is
to be found, I believe, in his comment that:
Here it is difficult to see that what
is at issue is the fixing of concepts.
A concept forces itself on one. (This
is what you must not forget.) (p.204)
And also in his thought recorded on page 198:
The concept of a representation of
what is seen, like that of a copy, is
very elastic, and so to~ether with it
is the concept of what is seen. The~
two are intimately connected. (Which
is~ to say that they are alike.)
What he is saying here, it should be pointed out,
is

th~t

it is the conceut which is essential, and by

imulicatiort not the formulation of similies. The use of
the words "like" or "as" can only be possible when an
object of comnarison already exists, and clearly our
problem here is to articulate the basis for any object
of perceution, including the single "uncomparable" ones.

4)

The evidence which I use to support this case
rests on two points:
1 - Wittgenstein notes that there can well be human beings

~ho

la.ck the capacity to see something!!.!!.

something (p.213). This lack he terms "aspect-blindness"
and states that it is akin to the lack of a "musical
ear" (p.214). This can be taken to indicate that the
theory of asnect-seeing is not intended to cover all
situations and therefore cannot be the foundation of a
general theory of perception. Rather, it should be
viewed as Wittgenstein's "special" theory of perception.
2 - Wittgenstein actually provides us with an example of a situation in which his "special" theory of
"seeing as" does not a-pply in noting on page 195:
It would have made as little sense for
me to say "Now I am seeing it as ••• 11 as
to say at the sight of a knife and fork
"Now I am seei~g this as a knife and
fork". This expression would not be understood. - Anymore than: "Now it's a fork"
or "It can be a fork too".
Ordinarily then, we do not, can not sensibly,
appeal to other objects through the device of similes.
Now perhaps it is because such objects simply do not
have a propensity to interpretation in more than one
language-game, but I think that the central phenomenon
is much more basic than this.
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Essentially I want to argue that "Our problem is
not a causal but a conceptual one" (p.20)). Insofar as
this is true, every act of perception is based on the
concepts which we possess. Thus, for example,
Sea native

~

South

!!!.!.! see something when he views for the

first time a shiny asphalt tile floor, and to a certain
extent what he sees will be the same as what I see assuming that there are, of course, certain basic language-~ames

which we have in common. These language-games

which we have in common as physical beings will contain rules referring to solid objects, straight as opposed to crooked lines, transparent as opposed to opaque
surfaces, etc •• What we will not have in common are the
similes (aspects) generated by dissimilar languagegames. Hence, while I view the floor as asphalt which
is "like rubber", he will perhaps view the same floor
as "like tree bark only smoother".
In conclusion, then, all objects will be "seen"
through concepts generated within language-games, which
I shall call first level perception; then, certain objects will be viewed through a further articulation of
various Rspects which a given object has in common with
other objects. This is second level perception. Concer~ing

the auestion "Which objects are suseutible to

second level Perception, and why?" I will decline an
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answer, siding with Wittgenstein in suggesting that
such a question is the problem of psychologists.
Now, I hope that I have shown with some degree of
clarity thqt Wittgenstein does not make a strict distinction between the grammatical and the empirical.
Ho..,.rever, in presenting his position I do not wish to
imply that there are not any problems connected with it
because in fact I feel that there are several rather
disturbing points related to his view of perception.
The first onjection which I have is that Wittgenstein is not at all clear on the relationship between
the world and language. Does the world exist in some
sense independent of language and merely become manifest through language? Or are we to assume that (borrowing Heidegger's terminology) the world and language are
"equi-primordial"? The point is that we are only given
the language-game analogy, and it simply is not directed toward the problem of beginnings. Hence it would seem
that one could hold either position.
What Wittgenstein would like us to think about, of
course, is that "the world confronts us only within
language-games and is thus already articulated in detail and ordered according to the most diverse principles" .1 This I will let stand for now, until it be1. Specht, .Q.E.cit., p.154
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comes necessary to reconsider the topic in Chapter III.
The othP,r problem which I find here regarding the
relationshin of the graMmatical and the empirical
centers around "object articulq,tion" in Gestalt psychology. To point out the difficulty, we are told on the
one h9nd that the constitution of objects is entirely
within lqnguage-games and that more specifically it
proceeds in accordance with the grammar under which
we are operating. Furthermore, this grammar is not
imposed but is more or less arbitrary, being arrived
at by convention.
On the other hand, Gestalt psychology has

estab~

lished certain principles of "Form" and "Ground"
articulation which surely seem to be inherent in a
given figure (object).

1

These articulations, moreover,

are not apparently "choices" which we possess as possible views of an object. but rather are held to be
rigid characteristics of the figures themselves, characteristics which force us to view them in a certain
W8y. These articulations include: 2
(1) Orientation - Essentially it is held that
"there are ma.in directions in space. the horizontal
and the vertical, and that these directions exert an
1. K.Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology,
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963, Chapter V.
2. ni£
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actual influence upon the processess og organization
by making figural organization easier in the main than
in the other directions." Also this implies that the
ground is always "symmetrically distributed in all
directions".
(2) Relative size also must be considered in many
instances for "if the conditions are such as to produce segregation of a larger and a smaller unit, the
smaller will ••• become the figure; the larger, the ground."

(3) Enclosing and Enclosed area: " ••• if two areas
are so segregated that one encloses the other, the enclosing one will become the ground, the enclosed one
the figure."

(4) Density of Enerp:y: "Under certain conditions
it is ••• pl~usible to assume that within a certain area
the process energies of figure and ground are equal.
Then if we hqve a small figure on a large ground it
follows that the density of energy must be greater in
the figure than in the ground, proportional to the ratio
between the ground and the figure area."

(5) Internal Articulation: In figure-ground articulation, those parts "which have the greater internal
articulation will ••• become figures."

(6) Simplicity of Resulting

Org~nization:Symmetry:
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Essentially, the figure-ground distribution will be as
simple as possible. This is often noted through the
resulting shapes which will tend toward symmetrical
formation.

(7) Centre of Interest: Since it is figures which
become the objects of one's interest, it must be conversely true that "where the centre of our interest
lies, there ••• a figure is likely to arise."
Now the problem is that only #7 would seem to be
"explained" through concept formation within specific
language-games. Concerning the other six, it would appear that the phenomena are so general that if they
are not "caused" by the objects themselves than we can
only appeal to Forms of life. But did we not see that
objects were constituted within individual languagegemes? And yet it seems that this constitution is so
general that it invades all games and thus cannot really
be based on language-games at all but is generated solely
by Forms of life! If so, what are we to make of the socalled arbitrary nature of the grammar of such games?
With this question asked I will close my discussion of language and turn to an investigation of mathematics, an investigation which should prove quite essential in the quest for a philosophy of science.

III
MATHEMATICS

In this chapter Mathematics will be considered. In
the last chapter it was argued that for Wittgenstein
any linguistic activity could be considered to be a
la.nguage-game. Here, it will be argued that Mathematics
too may be considered to be a language-game. As such,
this

language-~ame

of Mathematics occupies

a rather

UY11que pos1 ti on within the perspective of this essay
hP-cR.use:
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A) Historically Mathematics has always been viewed
as being closely related to the scientific enterprise either as an essential component of it
or as a most convenient tool w:t th·.which to work.
And, it is only on rare occasion that Mathematics
is not so viewed. 1
B) Mathematics is a topic which is most extensively
discussed by Wittgenstein, and hence his treatment of it can reasonably be expected to reflect
many fundamentally important points with regard
to the character of his thought.
Now, in qttempting to outline Wittgenstein's thought
with regard to Mathematics, I will attempt to show that
basic9lly it parallels his view of language; and, remembering my contention noted in the introduction
concerning the assumption of similarities between
MathP-matics and Science, I will hold as a working hypothesis that what is noted concerning Mathematics applies
also to Science. Essentially this hypothesis is based
on the assumntion that Wittgenstein's views regarding
two or more distinct
simil~r

rnqy

su~jects

or disciplines will be

insofar as the various subjects or disciplines

be shown to resemble one another. In this regard
1. See, for instance, Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers,
M~rtinu~ Nijhoff, 1962, as an example of this
position. Schutz incidentally mirrors much of the
thou~ht of the Phenomenolo~ical School. This position, however, will not be investigated in this essay.
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we note that Mathematics and Science have a rather
exact internal structuring, each possesses its own
special language, each is independent (more or less) of
other disciplines or "fields of inquiry", etc •• The
differences which are often noted in contrasting Mathematics and Science will additionally be held to be less
distinct than ordinarily is suggested. Thus, for example,
the argument that Mathematics may be viewed as having
a totally "anAlytic or rational" character while that
of Science is "synthetic or empirical" is softened considerably by Wittgenstein in suggesting that Mathematics
possesses a certain synthetic character and that Science,
insofar as it operates within a language-game of its
own making, may be viewed as somewhat analytic. in character. This will be considered further, but here it is
perhaps interesting to note that such "softening" of the
differences between Mathematics and Science helps to
strengthen our initial hypothesis. Of course, in
Chapter IV I shall modify this picture somewhat, but
such modifications are not essential at this point.
In the

Investt~ations

Wittgenstein emphasizes the

chqracter of language-games as a multiplicity of
activities by giving us a somewhat random list of examples (2)). Much later, he speaks of Mathematics as
an activity {p.227). This I take to indicate that
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Mathematics can validly be described as a languagegame •.
In further support of this position the following
points are noted:
A - As was the case with language-games involving
"ordinary lqnguage" so too here with Mathematics Wittgenstein stresses the concept of "following a rule". He
notes, for example, that "The concept of the rule for
the formation of an infinite decimal is - of course- not
a specifically mathematical one". 1 Further, he notes that
"The concept of this rule is not more ma·thematical than
that of: following the rule •••• For the expression of
the rule and its sense is only a part of the languagegame: following the rule".
B - For Wittgenstein "meaning" is related to "use"
and "use", of course, occurs within specific languagegames. This being the case, one may inquire into questions of meaning by asking, "What language-game is being
plgyed?" Likewise in his discussion of Russell's system2
of Mathematics, Wittgenstein indicates that the meaning of certain terms such as "provable" and even "true"
must be referred to specific systems.
Just as we ask: "'provable' in what
system?", so we must ask:"'true' in
what system?"
1 • RFM , p .186
2. RFM, p .51
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This would appear to be asking the same sort of
question as "What language-game is being played?" insofar as both language-games and systems are intended
to be final referents of meaning.
C - Related to the point just noted is the point
that use not only establishes meaning within a given
system of Mathematics but that it gives meaning to the
entire system (taken as a whole).
"It is the use outside mathematics, and
so the meaning of the signs, that makes
the sign-game into mathematics."
(fil'.11, p.lJJ)
Once again, the notions of meaning and use, which
are referred to here, are basic characteristics of his
language-game analogy.
As a language-game, Mathematics displays the
characteristics of language-games, of course, and thus
the activity which we term "Mathematics" should be
liable to description in much the same terms used in
discussin~

language. Accordingly in answer to the ques-

tion "Whqt is Ma.thematics about?", we would fall into
error according to Wittgenstein if we answered that it
described a system of mathematical entities (Plato's
view) or that it renresented what we could term
"empirical '2'.eneraliza.tions" (Mill's view), or that it
represented any atteMpt which was based outside of the
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activity itself. For, as was the case wi.th language,
we roust view this activity in terms of the concept of
~·"If

we wish not to, be misled we shall do well to

direct our attention away from the question as to what
they 1 are about to the use we make of them". 2
In affirminp; this position all extra-linguistic
considerations have been excluded from an analysis of
Mathematics and we are obliged to consider the language-game itself.
In defining a game we appeal to the rules of that
game. In Mathematics we can divide this set of rules
into two groups, those which refer to the

appl1ca~ion

of Mathematics and those that are related to the
activity itself.
With

re~ard

to the application of Mathematics,

as for example in the proposition "3 cumquats + 2 cumquats = 5 cumquats", Wittgenstein tells us that the
certainty of this proposition does not reflect some
contin~ent

truth about cumquats nor a necessary con3

nection between concepts.
mined by

the~

Rather ·its "truth" is deter-

we make of such a proposition. The

use of this proposition is that we take such calculations to be definitions of a sort'*' which guide us
1.Mathematical terms & propositions
2. A~_AMhrose, ·"Wittgenstein On Some Questions
in Foundations of MatheMatics", in Fann,p.270
'· !bid, p.269
4. Ibid, p .279
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whenever we attempt to calculate. Further, the application of mathematical propositions must not be viewed
as some type of experiment {p.218) because an experiment implies that the outcome of our activity (adding)
may go one way or another, but this is precisely what
we will not allow, this is

~

how we have decided

(agreed) to use such propositions. Rather, through our
agreement we have explicitly consented to hold that
nothing should count as falsifying a correctly formed
mathematical proposition, that nothing should be allowed as evidence which runs counter to the proposition
that "2 + 3 =5" •
If in fact an experiment is conducted and the
results do not point to the proper sum, then we naturally assume that either we have made a mistake in calculating or else that there has been some mutation of
the objects to which our proposition was originally
applied. This is to say that whenever we do not get

"5" when we add "2 + 3" then we are said to have made a
mistake, to have used the proposition incorrectly. "5"
and "2 + J" are thus construed as reflecting a certain
identity - they are held to be "equal" to one another.
And, because we take these two propositions to be in
this sense the same, it becomes a rule, for "the use
of the word "rule" and the use of the word "same" are
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interwoven"(PI:224). It is because of this that we can
substitute "5" whenever we see the expression "2 + 3"
and vice versa (RFM v-3}.
Now, the basis of this agreement (ultimately) is
the same as in all language-games, namely Forms of life.
What we have here, however, is not just another appeal
to Forms of life but what perhaps may be the best example of the relationship which obtains between a given
language-game and Forms of life.
An interesting point that has been overlooked by
all investigators thus far is that in many of the
instances in which Wittgenstein mentions Forms of
life in the Irnrestigations, he has just concluded, or
is in the process of, talking about Mathematics. Thus,
while we do not find a noticeable proximity of the
notion of Forms of life to Mathematics at (19) or on
page 174, we do find their mutual occurrence at (23),
(241), and on page 226.
This leads me to believe that far from seeking
to include the language-game of mathematics as merely
another game among many, we may actually view it as
an imoortant model of the way all language-games
function.
On

pa~e

226 he notes: "I

h~ve

not said why ma.the-
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maticians do not quarrel, but only that they do not" •••
and a little further on that: "What has to be accepted,
the given, is - so one could say - forms of life". The
rather amorphous agreement that we all find in accepting that "2 + 2 = 4", for example, is thus pointed out
in perhans its starkest form, an agreement so basic that
he seemingly cannot really "explain" it but only feels
canable of offering a prayer of thanksgiving, saying
that we can only "give thanks to the Diety for our
agreement"(2'34).
Mathematics may not on this account be an ideal
language (or language-game) but it certainly does seem
to be capable of best pointing to the extreme generality which is housed in the Forms of life, a generality
so vast that it is not affected by the fact that we are
operating in any one of a number of language-games
such as French or German or Greek or "business". Linguistic relativism does not.negate the possibility of a
"best linguistic model", one may thus conclude. The
application of mathematical propositions and terms is
accordin~ly

to be viewed as the acceptance of rules

based on the most

~eneral

sort of agreement in Forms

of life.
There is, of course, another aspect of the languagegarne of Mathematics to be considered, that aspect which
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involves the activity which occurs within the game itself. This is the work of the mathematician, and the
label which is used in reference to this activity as
it is viewed by Wittgenstein is "Constructivism".
At this point in order better to concern ourselves
with Wittgenstein's constructivism, we must turn to
his

Re~arks

on the Foundations of Mathematics. However.

this is only being done on the basis of the observation
that the remarks presented by Wittgenstein.in Remarks
on the Foundations of Mathematics are of a piece with
the thought of Philosophical Investigations. 1
Now in the Remarks Wittgenstein explores Mathematics by focusing his attention on the notion of
mathematical proof. To begin, he notes that a proof
'is "a single pattern, at one end of which are written certain sentences and at the other end a sentence
(which we call a "proved

proposition"){~

I-28).

Thus we are given a finite proto-example through
which the various activities of mathematics can be
viewed and upon which the various notions that were
used in describing
i~ations

l~nguage

in the Philosophical Invest-

can be here applied with reference to mathe-

matics.
OnA of the first notions that we find here is
1 • .!!.!21• p.vi (Editor's Preface)
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that of rules. Rather than accepting the position that
the propositions that go to make up a proof follow one
another logically (logical inference), he holds that
"when I say 'This proposition follows from that one',
that is to accept a rule"(RFM I-J6}.
Mathematics like language is seen by Wittgenstein
as rule-governed activity. In a proof, the rules actually
can be called transformation rules and accordingly it
can be seen that "when mathematics is divested of all
content, it would remain that certain signs can be
construcrted from others according to certain rules"
(~

II-)8}. What we have is a mathematical machine,

Wittgenstein tells us, "driven by the rules themselves",
obeying "only mathematical laws and not physical ones"
(RFM III-48).
A

~roof,

then, provides us with the framework in

which, or rather around which, the various languagegames of mathematics are played. Viewed in this manner,
we can easily see why Wittgenstein holds that "a mathematical proof moulds our language"(RFM II-71). It
organizes our possible mathematical moves in the same
manner that our moves are organized in other languagegames.
But, one could ask, isn't there a certainty here
in Mathematics that one fails to "explain" through an
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appeal to rules? After all, rules are arbitrary and
yet 1t most surely is !!.Q! the case that all mathematical activity is arbitrary.
In reply to this Wittgenstein most assuredly
would note that Mathematics is essential to our whole
life (RFM III-52) and that we all depend on the certainty that is found in Mathematics. But it is a mistake
to oppose certainty and the arbitrary nature of rules
because they are essentially related to one another.
First one must realize that although the rules which
are first layed down may be completely arbitrary, the
rules which are subsequently formulated are not arbi'trary insofar as they must be in accord with already
existing rules. To refer to Wittgenstein's analogy of
the town in the Philosonhical Investigations we might
sgy that any construction of a new street must take
into account the already existing pattern of streets.
(See p.183, RFM)
Furthermore, he tells us that "to accept a proposition as unshakably certain - I want to say - means
to use it as a grammatical rule"(RFM II-38), and that
it is this which removes uncertainty from it. Mathematics must be viewed as normative (RFM V-40) but he
is quick to say that "norm" does not mean the same
thing as "ideal". Rather "norm" must be taken to
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signify somethtng closer to "what is accepted through
general agreement". In this sense then, Mathematics
is seen to be a "network of norms"(RFM V-46), which
is to say that it is a network of concepts and rules
based on agreement.
This agreement that he finds essential to Mathematics is, of course, the same sort of agreement
which was found to be at the foundation of the use of
language itself in the Investigations. Here he notes
the exact same thing at RFM I-152:
What does people's agreement about
accepting a structure as a proof
consist in? In the fact that they use
words as language? As what we call
"language" •
He also tells us that when we "go through" a
proof and accept its results, this merely reflects
use and custom among us, or "a fact of our natural
history"(RFM I-63). Further, any "laws" which may be
viewed as an objective source of compulsion (such as
the laws of inference) must actually be seen as being
essentially no different than any other laws of human society (RFM I-116). The depth of our certainty
is merely a reflection of the extent to which men are
willing to go in accordance with what has been agreed
unon, the depth of convention.
On the basis of this analysis, then, what can we
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best say that the mathematician actually does in doing
Mathematics? Well, Wittgenstein notes that he can be
likened to a landscape gardener (RFM I-166). As such,
the mathematician may construct various transformations
(descriptions) on paper in the manner that a gardener
may plan on paper a certain landscape. In both cases,
Wittgenstein notes, the activity proceeds without the
determination of actual use; it makes no difference
whether or not people actually will "walk" on the
paths they both describe. The intended considerations
may be aesthetic, one could say, at this point rather
than practical.
"The mathematician is an inventor", he tells us,
"not a discoverer"(RFM I-167). The mathematician does
not go out and look for his objects of concern, but
rather he "makes them up", creating new forms of
descriptions. But we would be short-sighted to assume
that these were ordinary descriptions {poetic ones, experimental ones, or the like). Rather, because mathematical propositions (descriptions) have the dignity
of rules, they are, once invented, deposited among
the standard measures (RFM I-164) and can in turn be
used later to invent still other descriptions - each
description, each rule, following the rules which
have

.~lrea.dy

been laid down.
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But the invention of description is not the mathematician's sole activity, for he also creates essence
(RFM I-32). This we come to see when we observe that
while the mathematician is an inventor and not a discoverer, discovery is an aspect of mathematical activity - an aspect which must be adequately described.
The description offered by Wittgenstein initially notes that before something can be "discovered" it
must first be present; and, that since all other
avenues have already been cut off (independent mathematical entities, etc.), the presence of discoverable
"facts" can only be found to rest with the mathematician
himself.
The reason why Wittgenstein wants to hold that
the mathematician creates essence can be found to rest
on the already noted relationship between concept
formation and the constitution of objects in language
(here, in mathematics). As was the case in the
Investi~ations

so too here we are informed that:

••• the proof changes the grammar of
our langua~e, changes our concepts.
It makes new connexions, and it
creates the concept of these connexions. (It does not establish that
they are there; they do not exist
until it makes them.)
(RFM II-31)
A mathematical proof creqtes new concepts (RFM
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II-41) which help us to comprehend things (RFM V-46),
which guide us as we saw earlier to actually perceive things. It is in this regard that we can best
understand when Wittgenstein tells us that "mathematics as such is always measure, not thing measured"
(RFM II-?5} •
As was the case in the Investigations the limit
of the empirical, which Wittgenstein maintains in his
discussion of Mathematics, is concept-formation (RFM
III-29). This is important to note because mathematical
discovery is held

t~

be an empirical activity. An

example of this is given by Wittgenstein in a discussion concerning

synthetic~

priori propositions at

RFM III-39 to 42. Here he relates that "the synthetic
character of the propositions of mathematics appears
most obvious in the unpredictable occurrence of the
prime numbers." To explain, there is no formula by
means of which one can derive a listing of primes.
Rather, what one must do is to arm oneself with the
concept of "prime number" and then experiment in an
.qttempt to discover exactly what numbers are in fact
prime and which are not. The proposition "There are
prime numbers" is

!!_

priori insofar as we can determine

prior to experience that 1t is in fact true based on
the concept of "prime"; but, it is also synthetic "for
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one can say that it is at any rate not discoverable by
an analysis of the concept of a prime number" exactly
what numbers they are. Hence the actual discovery of
primes is held to be an empirical matter.
Now, what this account actually does is to reinforce the observation made in Chapter II in which it
was maintained that the empirical and the concetual
are intimately related for Wittgenstein. Thus, as is
plainly shown here, one cannot search for and discover
primes unless one already has the concept of prime with
which to work. Not only that, but it would appear that
for Wittgenstein one cannot perceive any number as a
number unless one possesses a concept of that number,
for as he notes, a number in Mathematics is a mark of
a mathematical concept (!!!11 V-35}.
But of course the empirical aspect of Mathematics
does not reside solely in this sort of discovery.
There are other instances in which experimentation is
conducted with reference to mathematical propositions.
These instances tend, however, to overlap into other
language-games which use mathematical propositions
and proofs but which one would hesitate to call strictly mathematical.
A consideration of these instances, Wittgenstein
tells us, must be based on an examination of the

~
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that is made of these mathematical propositions and
proofs. In discussing the nature of calculating he
often asks for the distinction between a calculation
and an exneriment. He of course notes that the connexions which we observe in calculating are connexions
in grammar (RFM I-128), and that we must draw a line
between calculating and experiment (RFM I-109), but
i_t is ultimately how we use something that turns it
into an experiment (RFM I-160).
On this view anything can validly be held to
be an experiment. For example, one normally would
not consider breathing to be an experiment, but there
are times (say immediately after being hit hard in
the ribs) when one could properly be said to experiment with breathing (to find if there is any pain, etc.).
Likewise with calculating, Wittgenstein notes that
we ordinarily do not consider it to be an experiment
to add "?+ 5" but on the other hand elementary school
teachers do send children to the blackboard to try
and find the sum of "7+ 5" and other similar problems.
a further point which is made is that in calculating we do not allow just any result to be the correct
one, while in an experiment any result which is obtained under the proper conditions {verification of
experimental controls, etc.) is accepted. In calculat-
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ing we do not accept a result because we arrive at it
once, or even many times, but because we hold that it
must be the result.
Likewise, a proof is not an experiment because
unlike an experiment "a mathematical proof must be
perspicuous"(RFM II-1). We must be able to reproduce
it easily and exactll every time we so attempt. Now,
this may appear to apply equally to so-called "refined" experiments, but a further condition serves
to emphasize the distinction:
To repeat a proof means, not to.reproduce
the conditions under which a particular
result was once obtained, but to repeat
every step and the result.
(!!fil1 II-55)
To summarize this account of Mathematics we agree
with Anderson 1 that most of the problems discussed
(following a rule, etc.) may bear different details
but nevertheless are one in spirit with the discussion
presented in the Philosophical Investigations. Within
the scope of this essay that is all that is of interest,
for as was noted earlier the intent of introducing a
discussion of Mathematics was merely to find if the
subject was in fact handled by Wittgenstein in a manner

with the subject of language itself.
1. A.R.Anderson, "Mathematics and the'La.ngua.ge
Game'", in Philosonhy of Matherna.ttcs edited
by P.B.Benacerraf and H.Putnam, Prentice-Hall,

analo~ous

1964, p.481
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On this account we need not attempt to criticize
WittP;enstein's handling of specifically mathematical
topics such as Cantor's theorem and Godel's theorem.
What is of interest, based solely on a desire for a
"complete" view of mathematica.l activity, is a clarification of the charge that Wittgenstein's notion of
proof goes only so far as to include calculating and
perhaps simple elementary proofs such as one finds in
basic Algebra and Geometry but does not appear to inelude "higher level" proofs which appear to be more
than mere "ma.chine problems" and which actually require imagination and more often than not vast in·genui ty. 1
My concern is that if these "higher", more complex
proofs are in fact essentially different (represent a
different sort of activity) than simple proofs and
calculations, then an examination of "what mathematicians
do" is not yet complete. However, I wish to hold that
Wittgenstein's analysis is essentially complete because:
1 - All proofs must be grounded upon elementcalculations
2 - All proofs, as far as I know, exhibit transformations which run in accordance with,
1. I am specifically referring here to observations JTIAde by Paul Bernays in "Comments on L.
WittgenstP,in's Rem~rks on the Foundations of
Ma.themqtics, in Benacerraf and Putnam, .Q.12•
cit., pp.510-12.
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not against, accepted tranformation rules (grammar),
and

3 - All proofs, unless specifically memorized
(structurally), require some exercise of one's
imagination.
ematici~n

~hus

not only does the professional math-

exhibit ingenuity through his proofs but

likewise so does the student who on his own effort
"proves" the propositions of plane geometry.

IV
SCIENCE

Were Wittgenstein to have written a work entitled
Remarks on the Foundations of Science, he would more
than likely have discussed the thoughts he held regarding language, merely clothing them with new details as is the case with his Remarks on the Foundations
of MqtheTM.tics. This, of course, is what must now be
shown.
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Early in the Investigations Wittgenstein presents
us with a list of activites in order to give us some
idea of the multiplicity of language-games(2J). Among
these few examples, it is significant to note that he
has included many of the activities that one normally associates with Science. Here he has listed such
things as:
- Describing the appearance of an object, or
givin~

its measurements

- Reporting an event
- Forming and testing a hypothesis·
- Presenting the results of an experiment in
tables and diagrams
And, perhaps we may also include:
- Guessing riddles
Of course, these are activities which one finds
within Science. And, on the basis of (23) alone we
really cannot be sure that he intends for us to view
the entire enterprise of science as a language-game.
He never relates science and language-games anywhere in
the

InvP-sti~ations

(or in RFM). He does speak, however,

of Mathemgtics as an activity (p.227), thereby indicating
that we may speak of the many elementary activities which
go to make up Mathematics in a collective sense. Ac-
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cordingly, it would appear that he is willing to consider
the multiplicity of language-games not merely in terms
of a unitary exoansion but also in terms of some sort
of collectivity as well. This would seem to indicate
that although he does not explicitly say so, he is willing to view Science itself as a language-game. For
Wittgenstein, it would thus seem to be the case that
Science can and must be viewed as any other activity,
generally sneaking.
As a 113.nguage-game Science must be liable to
description in the same manner as other languagegames, that is, through its rules.
Now, a general description of a science often
suggests that it is a body of highly organized facts
which have been gathered through the scientific
method. These facts are further described as being
objective, reflecting "what really is". Relating this
account to Wittgenstein, I believe that he would most
definitely concede that "organization" is a distinguishin~

mark of a science. His

stron~

feelin~

about this was

in the TrRct8tus where he likened the activity

of science to the application of a mesh or net 1 and
he says nothing in the Investigations or Remarks which
1. See McGuinness, "Philosophy of Science in the
Tr~ctatus", International Revue of Philosophy,
1969, 155-66, for a detailed discussion of
this point.
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would indicate that he has changed his mind about this.
However, while he does not contest the view that
Science is a highly organized activity, he does object
to our viewing scientific activity as somehow concerned
with the collection of objective facts which are obtAined through "neutral" experimentation. The key here,
of course, is Wittgenstein's view concerning concept
formation both with regard to language in general and
Mathematics. If we focus on what he has said already
about concept-formation, we will see that the classical
notion of scientific activity as being neutral or
"objective" is compromised several times over. (Here,
I wish to hold that his view of this situation would
bear a marked resemblance to his discussion of the
"discovery" of primes and the construction of proofs,
of descriptions, in Mathematics.)
Thus it is noted that there are no scientific
objects prior to our conception of them; and, furthermore there cannot be any investigation of these objects until we are equipped with rules by which to
order our investigation.
For example, he tells us that "science would not
function if we did not agree regarding the idea of
a~reement"(RFM

II-72). This infers that prior to any

investigation there must already be agreement concern-
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ing the nature of what will be found. To determine
what will and what will not count as evidence is already to determine what will be "discovered" and what
will not be. We can only see what the concepts which
we possess allow us to see. This is the limit of Science
because it is the limit of the empirical.
In turn, if we are asked to give the ground on
which concept-formation rests, we can only answer
that it is language(I!f11 II-71) itself which in turn
is ultimately grounded in Forms of life.
The limits of empiricism are not assumptions unguaranteed, or intuitively
known to be correct: they are ways in
which we make comparisons and in which
we act.

(RFM V-18)

It is, then, Wittgenstein's remarks on the limits
of empiricism which must be seen to reflect his philosophy, his critique, of Science. To further establish
this point, I should like to offer the following observations concerning scientific laws, method, and
"truth".
Scientific Laws: Scientific laws are mentioned
in several places, either directly or indirectly, in
the Philosophical Investigations. At (54) Wittgenstein
states that a rule is like a natural law governing the
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play in

q

language-game.

1

Now, without concerning our-

selves
at the moment with the distinction between
t
nAtural lqws and scientific laws, it is noted that a
conceptual association has been drawn between rules
and laws. Having accepted this analogy, it then becomes
most profitable to make the distinction between natural
laws and scientific laws, because in so doing one can
then reasonably ask for the distinction which is manifest in the opposing foundations of these two categories
of laws.
Natural laws, of course, must be assumed to be
the more basic of the two 2 , and as such they can only
be bA.sed on Forms of life. One can easily see the relt;l. ti ve i nflexi bi li ty of such laws by recalling the
examples previously

~iven

concerning the height of

bq.sketball rims. If, however, scientific laws are
considered to be different than natural laws, then
their foundation must surely be different. At paragraph 79 it is noted: "The fluctuation of scientific
definitions: what today counts as an observed concomitant of a phenomenon will tomorrow be used to
define it." In light of this it would appear that the
distinction which can be formuli:tted as a hypothesis is
1. The same is held with regard to Mathematics, See
RFM, III-21.
2 .on the bA.sis of scone this would appear to be the
case. For examnle~ while E MC appears to find a
limit to its qpplicabiltty in smBll-narticle Physics,
"Al 1 men must d 1 e" does not at>near sub.1ec t to
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that scientific laws are arbitrary.
Of course, one could ask whether such laws are
completely arbitrary; and if they are not, then what
prevents them from so being.
In attempting to answer this sort of question, it
should be pointed out that there are still other types
of laws - traffic laws, laws of social conduct, etc. and that these laws too must be distinguished from
natural and scientific laws. Paragraph 54 does precisely this, Wittgenstein pointing out here that
there are many types of rules (here laws), each distinguished by the use which is associated with them.
Concerning these latter types of laws, Wittgenstein would hold that they are the closest things to
purely arbitrary propositions which we could imagine.

1

But if this is actually the case, then scientific laws
are not completely arbitrary, or rather they are less
arbitrary than laws formulated through convention.
As such, the following continuum could be visualized:
Natural laws
Scientific laws
Other laws(social, traffic,etc.)
Absolute free action(No laws)
1. I do not say thqt they are Rbsolutely arbitrary in
ni:t.ture bPc~use the concent of Forms of life must affect
qll Acivity if it (Forms of life) is to have anything
but ~ t~utolo~ical significance.

?7
Noting this situation, one can only offer the
suggestion that perhaps the above construction reflects a certain relative proximity or engagement with
Wittgenstein's Forms of life. 1 If this is the case, then
a new meaning can be attached to his analogy at (136)
where he speaks of engagement with the concept of
truth (as with a cogwheel).
Of course, l

t:

"rculd be wrong to hold that all

of our activity is geared toward reaching Forms of
life as if it were some sort of ideal entity (recalling Pl9to's analogy of the line in the Republic.) For
if we were to do this, we would be in violation of the
limit imposed by language as the "limit of the world".
Nevertheless, if there is a definite gradation by means
of which one can distinguish the various types of laws,
then we must be prepared to assume some sort of "essence" or entity toward which they are inclined (real1zin~

that such a goal need not be referred to as an

"ideal" but merely as some "most fundamental aspect"
of reality).
Once agqin, our problem is with a proper internretqtion of "Forms of life". The one which begins to
'2;i:i1.ri

some nl~usibili ty is that "Forms of life" is
1. It hBs been su~gested thqt instead of presentin~ a vertically-oriented line, an alternative
might be to present a horizontally~oriented,
sl0ned line, placing "Forms of life" above it.
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perhaps closest to being a sociological concept. This
is based on the observation that if "Forms of life" is
merely a linguistic construct, then it would appear
necessary to adopt a circular rather than a linear
"scale" of laws, language being the hub of them all.
But if we hold to differentiation based on degrees of
"arbitrariness", then we are forced tp point toward the
source of arbitrary decision - society.

1

The effect that

this would have if accepted is to ground Wittgenstein's
philosophy of language in the social. Regardless of
how far one must go before he feels satisfied, whether
one merely stops with the mere mention of Forms of life
or whether one suspects the need for further alalysis
and consequent elucidation, it should be clear that
one cannot observe Wittgenstein clearly until some
attempt is made to look directly into the sun, that is,
for

ori~ins

or ultimate foundations.

Scientific Truth: There is no distinction which
can be found in the Investigations (or BFM) between
scientific truth and "non-scientific" truth. Thus, if
one is to talk a.bout scientific truth, it must only
be through a discussion of truth in general.
In the Investis:rations there are several places
1. This admittedly is a radical interpretation of
Wittgenstein, but one which would not make him a
Sociologist as much as a Sociologist of knowledge.

7.9

wher the word "truth" is used; these are the following: paragraph 22, 136-7, 225, 544, and pages 222-J.
Also, the following passages can be cited: paragraphs

433-?, 44)-9, and 461-5.
From all of these, the most helpful to this project are 136 and 461-5. Taken together they asy about
truth that:
A - It is essentially related to language, and
B - It is reflected in a "proper fit" of all the
facts.
At 461-5 Wittgenstein asks whether an order anticipates its execution and whether a wish can be said to
determine what is going to be the case. Both of these,
of course, reflect similar situations insofar as they
can be put into the form of a more abstract question
of whether any linguistic activity determines what
will or will not be found to be the case. In answer
to this it is noted at {465):
Suppose you now ask: then are facts defined one way or the other by an expectation - that is, is it defined for whatever event may .occur whether it fulfills
the expectation or not? The answer has to
be: "Yes, unless the expression of the expectation is indefinite; for example,
contains a disjunction of different possibilities."
A similar answer is given by J.R. Lucas in his
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article "On Not Worshipping Facts". From his point
of view (which is here sketched because of its resemblqnce with Wittgenstein's position) facts are not
"good, simple souls"; they are not the "simple solid
elements out of which the whole fabric of our knowledge
is constructed. 1 As a matter of fact, the word "fact"
is systematically ambiguous, its meaning varying with
its context. Thus we can speak of fact vs value, fact
Y! interpretation, fact vs fiction, fact vs theory,

etc ••

2

In spite of this, one can in general say that
facts represent Points of agreement3, and that when
they are construed in terms of the word "true" this
agreement is qualified a.s "unquestioned" or "established",
or "accepted".
This qualification, of course, is grounded in
what a reasonable man living at a given time would
concede as true. Thus, Lucas concludes that "Facts
do not make the reasonable man, the reasonable man
makes the facts". And, those things which he would
not call a fact (in Science) would instead be called
a theory or a hypothesis or perhaps a mere speculation.
Not-1, what Lucas says about facts and what Wittgen1. See "Philosophical Quarterly", 8(1958), p.144
2. I bid, p .152
3 • I bid , p • 146
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stein says about laws are closely related, specifically
insofar as both men demand a foundation which consists of agreement. Truth is then viewed in terms of
a qualification which is imposed on this agreement.
For Lucas it is that this agreement must be made by
all "reasonable men of a ·given era". For Wittgenstein
it i,s in Forms of life. At (224) he stresses the vital
role of agreement with regard to language-games saying:
The word "agreement" and the word
"rule" are related to one another,
they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he
learns the use of the other with it.
But still, agreement in itself cannot be the only
ground for determining truth. One must, as it were,
stress even more strongly the concepts of "reasonable
men" and "Forms of life" 1 , otherwise everything can be
allowed as true.
On page 149 Lucas notes that "Agreement is not
enough to establish truth." And, that "Whenever we
say of anything that it is a fact it is always
logically possible that it might not be true and therefore not a fact; though we are not on that account unjustified in believing to be true what we believe to
be true. We can no other."
1. Which, of course, are not at all the same ·
things but which share a similar role for
the respective authors as they are held to
be ultimate "bqckdrops".
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Here for Wittgenstein enters the second consideration with regard to truth: there must be a "proper .
fit" of all the facts. Once again we are led to (136)
and the image of a fact {proposition) engaging with
the concept of truth (as with a cogwheel).
The procedure appears to be clear - one should
strive for unity, allowing what fits and discarding
what does not by comparing each new fact, each new
proposition, with the overall game as it is being
played. The problem with this has already been presented, of course. 1
Scientific Method: What Wittgenstein has to say
about "method" in general can be summarized as follows:
1 - There is not

~

method, but many methods,

each of which lies on a somewhat arbitrary basis, and
2 - Each method must be viewed within a particular

context.
At (133) Wittgenstei'n notes that the philosophical
method is not

~

method, though there are indeed

methods, like different therapies. This passage is
directed most obviously toward an account of "what
philosophers do" and contains the rather common
observation that not only do different "schools" of
philosophy tend towards different subjects of interest
1 • See pp .15-1 7

8J
but that they employ different methods as well. The
conclusion here is that there are a variety of languagegames, each played according to its own rules, within
Philosophy; and, the implication is that each method
must be judged solely in terms of the philosophical
language-game in which it is being used. Hence one
cannot say that one method is better or worse than
another because there simply is no absolute standard
by which all

m~thods

can be judged.

But of course if there is no absolute standard
then we are pretty much free to choose whichever
method best suits our purpose. On this account it
should not be surprising at all to find a linguistic
method, a transcendental method, a pseudo-psychological
method, etc. all living within the same philosophical
house • 1
Now this absolute standard, if it did exist,
would of necessity be presented in terms of some absolute "truth". Quite clearly then it is this lack of
such t:l.n absolute "truth", which has already been noted,
which not only allows but in a certain sense necessititAtes the use of a variety of methods.
1. It should be noted that this possibility of
various methods in no way runs counter to the
linegr representation of laws which I have alreAdy presented. Analo~ously, one might compare
the affect of natural laws to the laws of Ches~
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Recalling Witgenstein's notions concerning the
concept of truth, it can be agreed that not only is
there a lack of an absolute standard in Philosophy
but in all linguistic activites, and since Science
1s for Wittgenstein an essentially linguistic activity
there can be no absolute standard of truth within it
either.
Can what is stated explicitly at (lJJ) with
re~ard

to Philosophy be extended to include

Science (or any other language-game)? If it can be,
then there is not and cannot be

~

scientific method

but instead one must speak of scientific methods. One
need only consider the varied approaches taken in the
sciences to confirm this view, the dissimilar approaches
taken in Physics, Biology, and Antropology, for example.
However, there are those who hold that the various
methods of Science can in fact be viewed as one because they all operate within a framework of verification. (It is on this ground that the Positivists had
strived for a "unified science.)
Verificqtionism becomes meaningless as a unique
chqracteristic of Science, however, in light of Wittnoting that as the laws of Chess do not dictate
an absolute procedure towards checkmate, neither
do the l~ws of nature dictate the various approaches that mqy be followed in Science or Philosophy or any other field.
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genstein's thoughts on concept-formation. Essentially
this is so because verification as we have seen merely
deals with the emprical and Wittgenstein has shown
that we cannot stop with the empirical but must also
deal with the conceptual, the linguistic. An example
given by Anscombe 1 suggests the distinction:
Wittgenstein asks: "Why do people say
that it was natural to think that the
sun went round the earth rather than
that the earth turned on its axis?"
Anscombe replies: "I suppose, because
it looked as if the sun went round the
earth."
"Well", he asked, "what would it have
looked like if it had looked as if the
earth turned on its axis?"
What Wittgenstein wants to do here is to point
out the grammatical significance attached to the
phrase "it looked as if". At (353) he notes:
Asking whether and how a proposition
can be verified is only a particular
way of asking "Wie meinst du das?"
The answer is a contribution to the
grammar of the proposition.
Also, it should be noted that verificationism
only makes sense if there is an unquestioned standard,
the empirical, through which a given operation can be
discerned from another. Wittgenstein, as we have seen,
denies us this standard and hence can only allow a
1. Frorn·Anscornbe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p.151
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certain sort of conceptual verification which. as was
the case with the mathematical primes, can only amount
to an affirmation of the concepts which are already
displqyed. Thus, we can "verify" new concepts which
we create only through concepts that we already hold.
in this way continuing and correcting the description,
the gardener's Pathway, which is continually being constructed.
In summary, then Wittgenstein would point to
Science as a language-game. Within this language-game
the most prominent feature, of course, is that it is
rule-governed activity1 , the specifiic rules of this
language-game forming what Wittgenstein refers to as
its grammar. 2 This grammar, furthermore, reflects a
certain agreement among those who use it. but this
agreement is not based on the purely arbitrary decisions of those involved with it but rather is based on
the Form of life in which the participants of a specific
languqge-game find themselves.
The notion of empirical verification, which may
hold to be the vital point' in favor of scientific knowledge as the only knowledge worth considering, is
1. This position, incidentally, is taken up by P.
Winch in his The Idea of a Social Science,
thou~h not without modification. Cf .bibliography.
2. Conseouently following a rule in Science is
exactly the same as was noted with regard to
lan~ai::i;e and to Mathematics. See pp.49-50.
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shown to be qt best "misleading" because the notion of
"empirical" is not actually a valid (final) point in a
critical episemological inquiry. Rather, as Wittgenstein
points out, we must realize that there is something
which can be seen to ground the empirical - conceptf ormation.
The idea behind all of his discussions concerning
concept-formation is that anything which we call
"empirical" can only be known

(or~

in the case of

percention) through the concepts which we possess,
which are in a sense "prior" to the empirical. It is
here that we come to appreciate the importance of language in its role for Wittgenstein as the limit of the
world.
Language here is more than the vehicle of communication; it is held to be the essential tool required for concept-formation, and as such is the actual
basis of the empirical. It is with regard to this point
that Science is held to be an essentially linguistic
activity.
This view is not complete, however, until the inclusion of the notion of Forms of life. As I have argued,
this notion is one of the most ambiguous and definitely
the least discussed (by Wittgenstein) concept in the

88

Ph1losonh1cal Invest1Rattons. Yet. this concept ls perhaps the most 1mnortant asnect of his later philosophy,
esnecl~.lly

with rei;ard to Science. because w1 thout 1 t

Wittgenstein becomes merely another exponent of the conventionalist point of view.
Its presence, however, entails an abandonment of
the position that men can fashion language and languagegames on an absolutely arbitrary basis. As Wittgenstein
notes, "We do not agree in the language we use but 1n
Forms of life". Quite obviously, then, the languagegame of Science must include the notion of Forms of life.
I have tried to include it by suggesting that Forms of
life affect, to a greater or lesser degree, all of the
"laws" which are formulated by men and consequently that
the laws of Science are themselves affected by Forms of
life. It should be noted in this regard that I do not
use the words "determine" or "directed" but rather
"affected" because while it appears that there is some
sort of relationship between Forms of life and the
products of agreement reflected in various languagegames, Wittgenstein affords us no specific insight into the actual nature of this relationship. Furthermore,
an "affected" relationship does not appear to run
counter to the notions of degrees of arbitrary decision

on the part of language-game participants.
The concluding view of Science is thus one of an
essentially liguistic activity based on Forms of life
in which an essentially "dependent" operation of verification is contiually being performed. The operation,
of verification, of course, is recognized as the most
prominent characteristic of the language-game of Science.
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